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Introduction  
Sub-prime lending was but the last card in the 
house of cards that is the U.S. housing system and 
its senior partner – the global financial system. To 
those who say that no one could have predicted 
its collapse, I say “NONSENSE!” Not only was its 
collapse predictable; it was predicted. In 1975 – 
34 years ago – I wrote the following: 
Meanwhile the inability of working-class families 
to keep up existing mortgage payments has in-
creased mortgage defaults and foreclosures on 
both owner-occupied housing and apartment 
buildings…. Unable to deal with the causes of 
mortgage defaults and foreclosure, which lie 
within the institutions of capitalism, the options 
available will only compound the problem in the 
long run. The proposals all basically involve … 
increasing debt…. Adding more claims to future 
income in these ways only adds to the increasing 
vulnerability of the entire financial system as well 
as the mortgage system in particular….
Since that time, I have chronicled the growth and 
instability of this house of cards (Stone, 1978; 
1980a; 1980b; 1983, 1986; 1993; 2006b). 
Obviously, little heed was paid to my jeremiads. 
This article sketches how the house of cards 
was constructed and collapsed, and will identify 
a few of the elements for building a different 
and solid house.
The house of cards  
Just as there are four suits in a deck of playing 
cards, so there are four suits of cards out of 
which the housing house of cards has been built:
1.  Wide and widening income inequality;
2.  Persistent and pervasive racism in housing 
provision;
3.  Treating housing increasingly as a speculative 
commodity at all levels; and
4.  Over dependence on debt and the private ca-
pital markets to finance housing.
This deck of cards also includes wild cards and 
jokers in the form of public policies that exacer-
bated the growth and instability of the house. 
Note that, with the exception of racism, which 
has a particular character and dynamic in the 
U.S. and connection to the crisis, all the other 
suits of cards are in no way unique to the U.S. 
and have highly relevant global linkages.
1.  Wide and widening inequality: conse-
quences for housing
For a generation after World War II in most of 
the developed capitalist world, there was mo-
dest reduction in inequality. However, during the 
1960s the fabric began to unravel; the 70s were 
a transition time and by the 80s neo-liberal ideo-
logy and practice were well entrenched, leading 
to the drastic increase in inequality since then 
(Stone, 1993, pp. 103-140; Tilly, 2006).
The first consequence for housing, at least in the 
wealthier parts of the world, has been reduced 
affordability and rising house prices. On the one 
hand, since the mid-1970s most households in 
the U.S. have experienced little if any increase 
in their real incomes (Tilly, 2006, pp. 25-26). On 
the other hand, those at the top with more and 
more income have been driving up home prices, 
in both the owner-occupied and rental sectors, in 
existing housing and new (Stone, 2006a).
The second consequence has been decreased 
ability for most households to save. This, in turn, 
has had two major results: (a) Most households 
have had reduced capacity to make substantial 
down payment to buy, and hence there has been 
a push for lower down payments, i.e, higher 
loan-to-value ratios in the mortgage market, with 
associated increases in risk; (b) Furthermore, be-
cause middle-income households have not had 
money to put into savings (thrift) institutions, 
which traditionally were the self-sustaining 
source of most residential lending, housing fi-
nance has had to become more dependent on 
the capital markets.
The third major consequence for housing of 
widening inequality is that those at the top 
of the distribution have directly and indi-
rectly also pursued high profits in the capital 
markets, contributing to the bubble of mor-
tgage-backed securities.
2. Racism in all aspects of the provision of 
housing
There is a rather widespread view is that hou-
sing discrimination in the U.S. has largely ended, 
that segregation is an historical artifact that is 
gradually dissipating and that, to the extent it re-
mains, reflects free choice in the market place. 
None of this is true.
Segregation has at best only modestly declined, 
and discrimination persists in the rental, sale, 
financing and insuring of housing. The burdens 
are greatest for Black households in most parts 
of the country, but there is evidence that the 
situation is worsening for Latinos and Asians 
(Denton, 2006).
The relevance of this to the current crisis is that 
the convergence of demography and geography 
– i.e., structural racism – created a largely un-
tapped market, vulnerable to predatory practices 
in the sale, financing and refinancing of housing, 
as people of colour were swept into the grand 
illusions of mortgaged homeownership (Squires 
and Kubrin, 2006; Stone, 2006b, pp. 94-96).
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3. The speculative housing market
While treating housing as an object of speculation 
has a long and dishonourable history, it has be-
come particularly pernicious in recent decades. 
Everyone came to believe that they are entitled 
to make a killing in residential real estate, up and 
down the food chain – not just distant investors, 
intermediate mortgage packagers, and nearby 
speculators and mortgage brokers – but inclu-
ding far too many homebuyers and homeowners.
This attitude has been coupled with the ideali-
sation and over-promotion of speculative 
homeownership, based on a series of myths 
(that Kemeny, the author and a number of 
others identified decades ago; for critical exa-
mination of these myths, see, e.g.: Dean, 1945; 
Stone, 1975; Kemeny, 1981; Heskin, 1983; Edel, 
Sclar and Luria, 1984; and Stone, 1993, pp. 
18-22; for an Australian critical examination of 
homeownership, see Badcock and Beers, 2000):
I.  that you are always better off economically as 
a homeowner than a renter because you no 
longer have a landlord who can raise the rent;
II.  that homeownership assures you of free hou-
sing in your old age;
III.  that homeownership is a sound and effective 
way to build assets/accumulate wealth;
IV.  that property values always go up, at least 
as long as you can keep undesirable acti-
vities and undesirable people out of your 
neighbourhood; 
V.  that homeowners are full citizens, but renters 
are not;
VI.  that the degree of societal development is 
correlated with the homeownership rate; and
VII.  the illusion of ownership through the reality 
of DEBT….
4.  Over dependence on debt and the private 
capital markets to finance housing 
Because housing is costly to produce and most 
producers are relatively small businesses, hou-
sing development is very dependent on borrowed 
money. More significantly, though, because hou-
sing is both a commodity and long-lasting, the 
transfer of houses is financed almost entirely by 
borrowed money, with the property as collateral. 
Furthermore, because housing is a speculative 
commodity, it is the prime source of collateral for 
borrowing even without transfer, i.e., refinancing 
and home equity borrowing. 
Taking these three elements together, no sector of 
the economy has been as dependent on debt as 
housing. Over the entire period since World War II, 
housing-related debt has been the fastest growing 
component of the entire financial system. Over the 
past three decades, housing finance became fully 
integrated into global capital markets, with the full 
fruition of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and 
their derivatives. A major consequence has been 
that housing related debt has grown faster than 
the overall economy and hence faster than the 
ability to repay it. 
From the late 80s to early 90s, there was a deep 
recession in the U.S., declining house values, 
high foreclosures, slow recovery. From the mid-
90s to the mid-00s, the U.S. experienced the 
longest period of growth in over a century, but 
it was built on increasing inequality and debt. 
Combined with ever widening income inequality, 
and the more active and aggressive promotion of 
mortgage homeownership since the 1990s, the 
dependency of housing on debt has been turned 
into addiction, creating debt junkies at all levels 
of the system and pushers emerging at all levels 
because of enormous and growing opportunities 
for profit (Stone, 2006b).
Public Policies 
The instability in these suits of cards was in turn 
stimulated and exacerbated by an array of public 
policies:
a.  Housing and related Taxation Policies: Since 
the 1930s, the primary focus of housing 
policy in most of the predominantly white, 
English-speaking countries has been the pro-
motion of mortgaged homeownership. This 
has consisted of institutions to support lending, 
ideological promotion and marketing, and sub-
sidies through the tax system.   
 
The flattening of the progressive income 
tax and tax cuts in the U.S. since 1986 has 
contributed to widened income inequality, and 
provided more money at the top of the income 
distribution for speculation in housing and fi-
nancial markets.     
 
With regard to tax benefits for homeownership, 
they are particularly regressive in the U.S., but 
by no means unique. The benefits rise with 
tax bracket, house value, mortgage amount, 
interest rate. Over half the benefits flow to the 
top 10% of the income distribution. No wonder 
it has been labelled the “mansion subsidy.” 
Indeed, recently even conservative economists 
have been recognising that they distort the 
housing market, create perverse incentives 
to borrow and speculate, as well as depriving 
the Treasury of revenue (Glaeser and Shapiro, 
2003; Carasso, Steuerle, and Bell, 2005).
b.  Privatisation of the public institutions of housing 
finance (see Stone, 1993, Part II, and Stone, 
2006b): The end of the post-war prosperity in 
the 1960s led to increased competition for cre-
dit, rising interest rates, and disintermediation 
from savings institutions. One major response 
was the expansion and privatisation of secon-
dary mortgage markets. In 1968 Fannie Mae 
(FNMA) privatisation began; in 1970 Freddie 
Mac (FHLMC) was created. Fannie and Freddie 
are (were) quasi-public government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), with implicit government 
guarantees of their paper, but profit-motivated 
institutions with private shareholders. GSEs 
package mortgages into pools; they issue secu-
rities sold into capital markets backed by pools 
of mortgages. Initially these were plain vanilla 
pass-through securities bought mostly by insti-
tutional investors like pension funds, insurance 
companies and commercial banks.
c.  Deregulation and lax regulation of private fi-
nancial institutions and activities has been 
another, more publicised, major facet. A big 
push in the 1970s culminated in extensive de-
regulation of the financial system in the 1980s, 
which in turn was a direct cause of the dras-
tic decline of the traditional model of housing 
finance, leading to the late 1980s S&L crisis 
in the U.S. (Stone, 2006b). In the late 1990s 
there was a second wave, pushed by some 
of President Obama’s top economic advisors 
(Helmore, 2008). Add to deregulation, lax en-
forcement of remaining regulations and failure 
to regulate new, high-risk products and insti-
tutions over the past decade.
d.  Monetary policy: Loose money/low interest 
rates by Greenspan’s Fed encouraged bor-
rowing and speculation, and leveraging of 
little capital with lots of debt to invest in high 
risk/high return real estate and capital market 
vehicles (see, e.g., Morris, 2008, pp. 62-65). 
Implications for Households 
Trends pointed to problems even before the 
sub-prime surge. First, there was a steady trend 
toward bigger, more costly houses. Second, in the 
U.S. homeownership peaked in 1980 and then 
declined until 1994. But in 1995 homeownership 
started to increase, with a focus on lower income 
households, especially households of colour. 
(This was the result of various factors, including 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), easing 
of usury limits on interest rates resulting in more 
sub-prime lending, plus the Clinton administra-
tion’s homeownership push; see Stone, 2006b; 
Immergluck, 2009.) 
However, by the middle of the current decade, 
five vulnerabilities became apparent at the base: 
I.  the spread of high-risk non-traditional loans: 
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not just sub-primes, but a whole menagerie: 
alt-A, “ninja” (no interest, no job or assets), 
interest only, negative amortization, 100%+ 
loan-to-value, adjustable rate loans, option 
ARMs, etc.
II.  rising housing occupancy costs: not only due to 
mortgage resets, but also increasing cashing 
out of equity, including refinancing of original 
primes into sub-primes; and debt costs, add 
rising property taxes, heating costs;
III.  high leverage: meant lots of people with no 
equity cushion; so any decline in prices would 
mean negative equity in which default would 
be more likely;
IV.  declining incomes: many people on the mar-
gin of being able to afford their housing (and 
other) debts, even with multiple jobs/incomes, 
facing risk of default if laid off, personal or fa-
mily member illness, divorce, new child, etc.;
V.  declining property values: fewer and fewer 
buyers able to sustain ever higher prices 
meant eventually and inevitably prices would 
turn down.
Implications and Consequences for the 
Financial System  
Slicing and dicing of MBS into collateralised mor-
tgage obligations (CMOs), originated by Freddie 
Mac in 1984, was so profitable for Freddie and 
Fannie, that in the 1990s Wall Street began 
private pooling and securitising of prime mor-
tgages, outside of Fannie and Freddie, and then 
issued sliced and diced securities against these 
pools of plain vanilla MBS, derivatives of these 
securities, collateralised debt obligation (CDOs), 
etc. (Stone, 2006b; Immergluck, 2009).
But the mid-90s already gave hints of problems 
with securitisation and derivatives: computer 
models were inadequate because they did not 
account for the possibility of refinancing; thus, 
in the mid 90s there was an MBS crisis, with 
chaos in MBS markets (Stone, 2006b). Yet no 
constructive lessons were learned by the indus-
try, regulators or policy-makers. Instead, new 
opportunities and new products were launched 
in the MBS markets.
In order to expand the volume of MBSs, it was 
necessary to promote vast increases in mortgage 
lending: on the one hand, since homeownership 
rates in the US were declining overall and were 
especially low for households of colour, there 
was both motive and opportunity for a whole 
new wave of over promotion of homeownership 
to underrepresented populations; on the other 
hand, among existing homeowners rising house 
prices created enormous increases in home 
equity, stimulating an orgy of refinancing, home 
equity loans, purchases of 2nd and 3rd homes 
and investment properties, etc.
Non-prime lending (sub-prime, Alt A, etc.) 
had long existed, but there had been no se-
condary market because such loans did not 
meet Fannie and Freddie standards. So, there 
were limited originations of such loans until 
the early 2000s, when Wall Street, looking 
for highly profitable outlets for vast pools of 
cash, started to buy and securitise non-prime 
mortgages. This led to a stampede into high-
profit, non-prime MBSs and derivatives upon 
derivatives, with profits multiplied by fees and 
by high leveraging fostered by low interest, 
expansive monetary policies (Morris, 2008; 
Baker, 2009; Immergluck, 2009). 
Instability in Fannie and Freddie was already appa-
rent by early 2000s (Stone, 2006b). Nonetheless, 
with loss of market share to Wall Street, Fannie 
and Freddie lowered their standards to compete 
in non-prime secondary market and keep share 
prices up and stockholders happy, with heavy 
lobbying to prevent regulation.
This process generated almost limitless pro-
fit opportunities ostensibly for homebuyers, 
homeowners and speculators, but especially 
for the inventors and purveyors of exotic mor-
tgage products.
Of course it also piled risks ever higher, as each 
and every level – not just homebuyers and 
homeowners – became leveraged to the hilt, 
borrowing far beyond any realistic potential of 
repayment – built on the myth that residen-
tial property values always and forever rise – a 
classic bubble.
Culmination and Collapse  
Together these were a perfect storm that blew 
apart the house of cards. The vulnerabilities at 
the base resulted in surging defaults and fore-
closures, and not just on sub-prime loans. While 
the foreclosure rate is of course much higher on 
sub-prime loans, most loans are not sub-prime 
and, indeed, about half of foreclosures have been 
on prime loans. 
As all of the suits of cards had been built into an 
enormous yet precarious house, it was then ine-
vitable that the collapse would spread up through 
the financial system to create the worst global 
economic crisis since the Great Depression, in 
which housing finance was also deeply implicated.
HOW TO BUILD A SOLID HOUSE 
While it is apparent that a comprehensive program 
of reform is needed, my primary focus here will be 
on pieces of the ownership and financing agenda.
Ownership:  
How can we address two major sources of both 
housing affordability and broader economic instabi-
lity, viz, treating housing as a speculative commodity, 
and the over-dependence on debt to finance hou-
sing? We should greatly increase the amount of 
debt-free, non-speculative housing, which includes 
public housing, non-profit rental housing, and, my 
particular focus, an adaptation of the mutual hou-
sing alternative to mortgaged homeownership 
(Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, 1985; 
Stone, 1993, chapter 7; Stone, 2006c). 
A mutual housing association (MHA) is a non-pro-
fit cooperative corporation, made up of residents, 
prospective residents and other community 
members. An MHA finances housing to the grea-
test extent possible through capital grants rather 
than mortgage debt. Residents make a modest 
“down payment,” which is returned with inte-
rest upon moving out. In the conventional MHA 
model, capital grant financing is used to reduce 
residents’ costs. In the modified MHA proposed 
here, residents would have monthly charges in 
lieu of mortgage payments, with the amount 
based on some affordability standard. This money, 
which would have gone for mortgage payments 
in conventional housing, would instead, like indi-
vidual development accounts (IDAs), be put into 
safe investments such as term deposits at banks, 
money market accounts or similar vehicles; these 
investment funds could and should be managed 
by competent, respected, non-profit intermedia-
ries, such TIAA-CREF.2 Since wealth accumulation 
is separated from homeownership, residents may 
not sell their homes for a profit, thereby maintai-
ning affordability for future generations.
What does the model offers residents?
  control over their homes comparable to 
conventional homeownership;
  greater security of tenure because there’s no 
risk of mortgage foreclosure;
  asset development comparable in magnitude, 
on average, to conventional homeownership;
  but superior in terms of security (vulnerability), 
stability (volatility) and liquidity.
While especially beneficial for low and moderate 
income households, there is no reason for it to be 
limited. It is not second-class homeownership. It 
is a smart alternative that should be made widely 
available as a choice. 
16  The TIAA-CREF is a nearly $400 billion full-service financial services group of compa-
nies that has dedicated itself to helping those in the academic, medical, cultural, and 
research fields for over 90 years. For more information, please see www.tiaa-cref.org. 
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Financing:  
Debt-free non-speculative housing of all types 
should be financed by capital grants from Housing 
Trust Funds. In the US there are several hundred 
state and local HTFs, and in the summer of 2008 
a National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) was finally 
enacted, after a very long grassroots campaign. 
I have proposed that the NHTF be capitalised 
through a tax of about a few tenths of a percent 
on all capital market financial transactions, inclu-
ding stocks, bonds, mortgage-backed securities, 
derivatives, etc. Even such a tiny tax could ge-
nerate several hundred billion dollars per year 
(Stone, 1993, pp. 266-268;Baker, 2000; 2008).
Such a dedicated revenue source would be 
  progressively redistributive;
  not subject to the whims of the annual appro-
priation process; and
  not add to government budget deficits. 
It could provide financing for upwards of a mil-
lion units a year of debt-free non-speculative 
housing, though:
  new construction;
  acquisition of some private housing, such as 
foreclosed homes; and
  preservation of at-risk subsidised housing.
Macro-economic benefits:  
A tax on financial transactions would reduce spe-
culation in the capital markets. Also, under the 
MHA model the money that would have gone for 
mortgage payments into unproductive, specula-
tive housing wealth would under the MHA model 
be available for investment in productive activities 
for a sustainable future.
Housing Finance Reform 
In addition to the specific ownership and financing 
approach just described, I also propose a series of 
structural reforms to the existing housing finance 
system:
  Prohibit high-risk loans and restore plain vanilla 
mortgage loans: fixed-rate, fully-amortised, 
level-payment loans requiring non-negligible 
down payments (along with mortgage insurance 
and default insurance); 
  Restore and strengthen local, mutually-owned 
& public lenders: credit unions, mutual savings 
banks, depositor owned s&ls, community loan 
funds and public lenders (HFAs);
  Promote the Ginnie Mae model for mortgage 
securitisation: now that Freddie and Fannie are 
fully in the public domain, they should remain 
there (without shareholders, without highly 
paid executives, without high-priced lobbyists), 
issuing government-backed, plain vanilla pass-
through mortgage-backed securities on the 
plain vanilla mortgages; such securities should 
be prohibited from being sliced and diced and 
pyramided with derivatives; this would provide 
liquidity and access to the capital markets for 
responsible lending without the greed, specu-
lation and risk that brought the system down;
  Strongly regulate financial markets, with trans-
parency and accountability, including prohibition 
on pyramiding of securities, and including expli-
cit criminal as well as civil liability for violations.
Comprehensive Program  
These are a few of the building materials needed 
to construct a strong house on a solid foundation. 
For other elements of a comprehensive program to 
address not only the manifestations but underlying 
causes of the housing crisis, see the Appendix. 
Conclusion 
At this monumental moment, we have the op-
portunity to begin constructing a New Social 
Democracy for the 21st Century. I am not nai-
vely optimistic about the prospects politically, 
but am nonetheless certain that it is a goal 
worth pursuing.
We housing researchers have a particular res-
ponsibility in this effort - as intellectuals, as 
practitioners and as activists. Housing, as all of 
us surely know, lies at the core of the dilemmas 
and challenges facing our families, our commu-
nities, our nations and our planet. The resolution 
of these dilemmas is to be found not through the 
celebration of selfish individualism, but rather 
through the rediscovery of social responsibility 
and the transformation of our economic institu-
tions. Let us join in this grand endeavour.
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Appendix 
A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO 
SOLVE THE HOUSING, HOMELESSNESS 
AND INCOME CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
STATES
Expand social, non-profit, and non-speculative 
ownership and production of housing, to en-
sure long-term affordability, community viability, 
and responsible use of public resources. Social, 
non-profit and non-speculative housing can be 
expanded through: 
 new housing production;
  preservation of subsidised rental housing 
(public and privately-owned) as permanently 
affordable to low-income households, with 
increasing resident and community control 
and ownership; 
  financial assistance to low and moderate-in-
come homeowners who are shelter poor or 
facing foreclosure, in return for their agree-
ment to transfer to social ownership;
  buyout of absentee-owned, unsubsidised pri-
vate rental housing through negotiated sale 
or eminent domain. 
 Finance the production and acquisition of social 
housing through direct public capital grants ra-
ther than debt, to reduce both the affordability 
burden of mortgage payments and the instability 
of the financial system. 
Reform the financial system, in order to deflate 
the credit bubble, reduce speculative uses of 
credit and assure an adequate supply of credit 
-- to complement capital grants -- for productive 
investment in housing, as well as infrastructure 
and job-producing industry. All private capital 
market participants should be required to make 
below-market set-asides to finance non-specula-
tive housing and community development. Credit 
allocation authority and incentives should be used 
to steer private savings to community loan funds, 
state housing finance agencies and mutually-ow-
ned thrift institutions.
 Increase the capacity and scale of housing de-
velopment by socially-oriented developers, and 
increase public and community control over 
land and housing production. Public and social 
resources for housing development should be 
directed increasingly to community develop-
ment corporations, mutual housing developers, 
regional non-profit housing organisations, labour 
unions, and local housing authorities. Public fi-
nancing of responsible private development for 
non-speculative ownership should not be pre-
cluded, particularly if under community control or 
in joint ventures with social developers. 
 Reform landlord-tenant law to facilitate te-
nant unionisation and institutionalise collective 
bargaining rights, just cause for eviction, ha-
bitability standards and enforcement, dispute 
resolution, and resources for technical and or-
ganising assistance. 
Establish employer accountability and finan-
cial responsibility for contributing to meeting 
the housing needs of their workers and com-
munities. Unions should negotiate for housing 
trust funds as part of their members’ benefits. 
Private commercial and luxury developers 
should make linkage payments or meet in-
clusionary housing requirements. Other 
employers should establish voluntary housing 
programs or make payroll tax payments into 
housing trust funds. 
16  The TIAA-CREF is a nearly $400 billion full-service financial services group of compa-
nies that has dedicated itself to helping those in the academic, medical, cultural, and 
research fields for over 90 years. For more information, please see www.tiaa-cref.org. 
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 Recognise in housing and income policies the 
disproportionate growth of affordability problems 
among larger households, and among house-
holds headed by women (both non-elderly single 
parents and older women without spouses). 
Since the housing crisis is one of the causes and 
manifestations of the crisis of U.S. families (with 
“family” broadly understood to include both non-
traditional and traditional living arrangements), 
resources and support should be provided for 
appropriate and innovative housing schemes 
and designs, and supportive social and commu-
nity services, as well as economic assistance. 
 Enforce anti-discrimination laws fully and ag-
gressively, along with affirmative programs within 
communities of colour and the larger society to 
expand housing as well income opportunities for 
those who have always been disproportionately 
shelter poor because of racism. 
Support community control and resident em-
powerment in the production and operation of 
housing, in balance with principles of social res-
ponsibility, non-discrimination, and inclusionary 
planning and development. 
Assure adequate and secure incomes to all 
households. This should be through gainful em-
ployment at decent wages for all those able to 
participate in the paid labour force and through 
appropriate income supports for those who 
cannot obtain adequate incomes through em-
ployment. Income supports should consist of 
direct affordability assistance for those unable to 
afford social-sector housing costs, plus supple-
mental aid to the very lowest income households 
who would be unable to meet their non-shelter 
needs at a minimum level even with full housing 
assistance. 
Provide adequate public resources and allocate 
them equitably for social housing, community 
development, services, and income supports. 
Resources should be generated through ba-
lanced economic growth, redirection of federal 
budget priorities away from the military, plus 
creation of a truly progressive income tax (in-
cluding strong disincentives for speculation in 
housing, land and other assets, and phasing 
out of the increasingly regressive deductions for 
mortgage interest and property taxes). 
